We study a decentralized channel allocation problem in an ad-hoc Internet of Things (IoT) network underlaying on a spectrum licensed to an existing wireless network. In the considered IoT network, the impoverished computation capability and the limited antenna number on the IoT devices make them difficult to acquire the Channel State Information (CSI) for the multi-channels over the shared spectrum. In addition, in practice, the unknown patterns of the licensed users' transmission activities and the time-varying CSI due to fast fading or mobility of the IoT devices can also cause stochastic changes in the channel quality. Therefore, decentralized IoT links are expected to learn their channel statistics online based on the partial observations, while acquiring no information about the channels that they are not operating on. Meanwhile, they also have to reach an efficient, collision-free solution of channel allocation on the basis of limited coordination or message exchange. Our study maps this problem into a contextual multi-player, multi-arm bandit game, for which we propose a purely decentralized, three-stage policy learning algorithm through trial-and-error. Our theoretical analysis shows that the proposed learning algorithm guarantees the IoT devices to jointly converge to the social-optimal channel allocation with a sub-linear (i.e., polylogarithmic) regret with respect to the operational time. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm strikes a good balance between efficient channel allocation and network scalability when compared with the other state-of-the-art distributed multiarmed bandit algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the global proliferation of the Internet-connected devices, the novel use cases spawned by the research of the next-generation wireless technologies envision to support (massive) Internet-of-things (IoT) communications towards 5G. In typical application scenarios such as advanced metering and monitoring infrastructures for smart city/industry, the mIoT networks are based on the co-channel deployment of the computation/power-limited Machine-Type Communication (MTC) devices [1] , [2] over unlicensed frequency bands (e.g., MultiFire over LTE [3] ). Meanwhile, these novel IoT-centric applications demand frequent transmission of small-size data either directly between massive MTC devices [4] or by these devices over uplinks to IoT gateways. Thereby, to meet such specific demands, mIoT is expected to support the highvolume, delay-sensitive traffic of small and periodical data. The unique characteristics of mIoT imposes a series of challenges to the adaptation of the existing MAC protocols in protocol design. Especially, the networks are expected to support applications requiring a relatively high degree of reliability, efficiency and scalability, but on a basis of light-weight MAC mechanisms and minimum infrastructure, mainly due to the constraints of device complexity and power resources.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of handling an anarchy group of low-complexity IoT devices for their connection over the unlicensed bandwidth in a decentralized manner. More specifically, this study is inspired by the scenario where the IoT network underlays on the bandwidth of a licensed (cellular) network. In a typical setting of heterogeneous narrow-band IoT networks, the underlaying IoT transmission is able to retain an efficient data rate by adopting a proper resource-block spreading factor, while causing negligible interference to the licensed (cellular) users by scaling the transmit power accordingly [5] . Due to the limited computing/sensing capability of the low-power, light-weight IoT devices, it is impractical for the IoT devices to perform simultaneous, real-time channel estimation for multiple bands with unknown, time-varying activities of the licensed users. Also, due to the limited signaling capability of the IoT devices, a pure contention-based or reservation-based channel allocation scheme (e.g., random access or coordinated access) may not be able to meet the requirements of scalability, efficiency and reliability at the same time. For this reason, we aim to propose a low-complexity, purely decentralized allocation scheme that is able to associate the logical channels over the unlicensed bandwidth with each ad-hoc IoT device, while guaranteeing the social performance of the considered IoT network.
To achieve the two-fold goal of decentralized social-optimal channel allocation, we propose a framework of Multi-Player (MP) Multi-Armed Bandits (MAB) for the IoT devices to gradually learn their performance over each channel and then resolve the channel contention problem without explicit signaling. More specifically, we formulate the IoT devices as the players of an MAB game, and the fading channels as the stochastic arms of the MAB. To reflect the interference from the co-existing transmission of the licensed spectrum users, we further extend our framework of MP-MAB formulation by considering the underlying arm-value distribution to be non-stationary. In particular, the instantaneous value of an arm for each player (i.e., established link) is determined by the transmission context that the underlying licensed user happens to operate upon. Such an assumption is a multi-player extension of the contextual MAB problem [6] , where the payoff function of each arm for every player is jointly determined by the context (i.e., environmental information) and the players' actions. The goal of investigating this contextual MP-MAB is to find the optimal policy mapping from the random samples of context-reward pairs to a sequence of actions of channel association that maximizes the sum of received reward by the players along the time horizon. We propose a purely decentralized algorithm for the IoT devices to learn their policies of channel association in real time. As we will show in our algorithm design, the proposed learning scheme does not request the estimation of Channel State Information (CSI) or much a-priori knowledge about the stochastic model of context evolution. The proposed online learning algorithm can be considered to be a multi-player extension of the learning scheme in single-player contextual MAB [7] . Our theoretical analysis shows that it is able to achieve polynomial logarithmic regret over time and handle a large number of discrete contexts.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the related works in the recent literature. Section III mathematically transform the considered channel-allocation problem into a contextual MP-MAB game, based on which we propose the purely decentralized social-optimal policy learning algorithm in Section IV.
The efficiency of the proposed algorithm is mathematically analyzed in Sections V and VI, where Section V provides the theoretical bound on the regret of the proposed algorithm for contextual MP-MAB, and Sections VI analyzes the efficiency of the proposed algorithm when the contexts are not observable to the players. Section VII provides a series of experiment/simulation results regarding the proposed algorithm for heterogeneous IoT networks over unlicensed spectrum. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK

A. Channel Access Mechanisms for IoT Networks
The reservation-based MAC protocols, such as the canonical F/T/C-DMA or OFDMA schemes, face a critical issue of poor scalability in IoT networks. For these protocols, coordination over a dedicated feedback/control channel by the Access Points (APs) in a cellular infrastructure (e.g., the uplink resource allocation by eNBs in 3GPP NB-IoT networks [8] ) is also necessary. On the other hand, the contentionbased protocols, e.g., ALOHA and CSMA/CA, face the issue of inefficiency for large-scale M2M networks.
As a result, the hybrid MAC scheme is studied by a number of works in the literature [9] , [10] when a centralized coordinator (e.g., AP) is available in the IoT network. The hybrid MAC schemes are featured by the aggregation of the contention-based and the reservation-based protocols. They allow the network to guarantee fairness among contending users with ALOHA/CSMA-like schemes. The rate efficiency is then provided with pre-allocated orthogonal resources (e.g., time slots or sub-carriers) to a selected group of devices that win the resource request contention.
When APs (namely, infrastructure) are non-existent, self-organization is needed on the IoT device level using simple synchronization schemes. Then, random-access based on contentions becomes more suitable than the reservation-related schemes. In the scenario of multi-channel association with a dedicated common control channel, channel-contention resolution based on the RTS/CTS dialog over the control channels are proposed for devices equipped with multiple antennas/sensors [11] . Alternatively, decentralized channel swapping mechanisms are proposed for the case in which no coordination channel is accessible for timesynchronized nodes [12] , [13] or for nodes even without global synchronization [14] . Usually, nodes over each channel are assumed to be fully connected to avoid the hidden terminal problem. In different studies, an operational phase of broadcasting beacon packets over randomly selected channels is commonly adopted to either determine the level of congestion [12] or to locate free bands [13] , [14] for collision avoidance.
Particular mechanisms such as master node (known as SYNC node in [12] ) election are proposed to designate the IDs of nodes and channels that swapping/hopping is allowed for [12] , [13] , in order to achieve a convergent solution among the decentralized devices.
However, most contention/swapping-based decentralized MAC schemes in the literature prioritize noncolliding channel allocation over achieving social-optimal network performance. Furthermore, another obstacle for designing an efficient, decentralized MAC scheme over multi-channels lies in the lack of channel information in an unknown time-varying wireless environment. As a result, the demand for optimal decentralized MAC schemes inspires the adoption of a number of distributed stochastic learning algorithms, which range from decentralized stochastic learning automata in repeated channel allocation games [15] to channel allocation in a framework of MP-MAB based on distributed auction [16] or hopping [17] with certain levels of message exchanges.
B. MP-MAB for Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks
In wireless networking, the MAB-based formulation was first introduced for the single-user-multi-channel selection problem in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), where channel states are stochastic and not fully observable due to the unknown activities of the primary user [18] . In the single-player scenario, one single player learns its best policy of pulling arms (i.e., selecting channels) through repeatedly playing one of the candidate arms and observing the payoff of the pulled arms in a time-slotted manner [19] . When the pulled arm yields i.i.d. random rewards following a certain distribution of unknown parameters, such a fixed but unknown distribution can be used for abstracting the unknown wireless environment, i.e., the quality of each orthogonal channel. The goal of the single player is to maximize the expected accumulated reward, namely, the achievable transmit rate in the long run. Unlike supervised learning, the value of each arm in the MAB is not known in advance, and the player is only able to observe the value of the pulled arm, one at each time slot. Therefore, it is necessary to infer the arm-values from such historical partial observation through trial and error. Essentially, the solution to this well-know problem is about striking a trade-off between policy exploitation and exploration. Namely, the player needs to properly choose whether to gain the myopic optimal reward, or to further improve its arm-value estimation in order to avoid choosing a sub-optimal arm in the long run. The former goal is achieved by selecting the best arm/channel according to the available observation record, and the latter is achieved through proper policy exploration.
It is natural to extend the problem formulation from the single-player MAB to the case of MP-MAB [20] , especially in the multi-node context of CRNs. At each round of play in the MP-MAB, every player chooses one arm to pull according to its own observation history of arm-value feedback, while a certain level of coordination (i.e., messaging between devices) may be allowed based on different assumptions of information exchange capabilities [21] - [24] . When the channels are perceived as different arms, the rewards of the same arm observed by different players are frequently assumed to be drawn from different stationary but unknown i.i.d. distributions (e.g., [13] ), which reflects the independent pathloss and shadowing properties of different user links over the same channel. With such a multi-player formulation, a repeated game of heterogeneous players evaluating player-dependent rewards over the candidate channels (i.e., multi-arms) can be developed. Due to decentralized and simultaneous policy selection, collisions have to be taken into consideration when more than one player happen to choose the same arm. For this situation, a number of studies [21] - [23] assume that no player receives any reward, while some other studies [20] assume that the colliding players split the reward over the single arm in an arbitrary way. Such a model is frequently used to describe the user-channel matching problem in a CRN, where the channel condition is modeled to be stochastic, partially due to the unpredictable activities of the primary users [16] , [25] .
Compared with the studies in the literature, our research further extends the expressiveness of the MP-MAB formulation with a new dimension of freedom brought by the environmental context information [26] .
In general, such a formulation allows us to further address the randomness of the environment/network impact, which can be observed in numerous scenarios of wireless networking including network state changes (e.g., secondary-user handing-off between cells in a CRN [27] ) and cloud-side execution of multiple tasks with different levels of Quality of Services (QoS) [28] . In the considered scenario of IoT network operation over unlicensed spectrum, we employ a discrete set of contexts to quantitatively reflect the interference caused to the ad-hoc IoT links by the transmission of the licensed devices. Both of our theoretical and numerical analyses show that the proposed learning algorithm for MP-MAB is able to address the optimal decentralized channel allocation problem with explicit respect to the stochasticity in both the channel states and the non-controllable activities of the underlying licensed users at the same time.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider an ad-hoc IoT network, where M transmitter-receiver pairs (i.e., links) attempt to transmit over L (L ≥ M ) unlicensed channels in the underlay mode. Each link independently selects one of the channels to transmit over, and each channel is supposed to be dedicated to at most one operating link.
During the network operation, the licensed (primary) users may cause a random level of interference on each channel. Due to unknown stochastic user-mobility patterns and fast fading, the CSI parameters of each IoT link over every channel are considered heterogeneous and sampled from an unknown i.i.d. probability distribution over time. We also consider that the IoT links operate in a time-slotted manner, and the operating slot is set to be of the same timescale as the coherence time in the scenario of fast fading CSI. We adopt the mild assumption that at the beginning of each time slot, the IoT devices are able to know the instantaneous but discrete levels of the licensed transmission power over the spectrum through its beacon packets. However, they do not know either the channel statistics or the stochastic activity (e.g., power-selection) patterns of the licensed users. Due to the limited signal processing capability, an IoT device is only able to measure the QoS in best-effort bitrate over its selected channel at the end of a time slot. As a result, the IoT transmitter-receiver pairs have to deduct the information about the CSI, the device-mobility and the interference patterns from only partial information, namely, the QoS measurement of its selected channels over time. In addition, an IoT link has to implicitly infer the policies of the other links without inter-link messaging, not only to avoid collisions with other devices but also to learn its policies toward the social-optimal allocation.
The decentralized channel selection problem considered above can be formulated as an M -player, Larm contextual bandit game. Let x denote the context vector describing the licensed-user's power level over the bandwidth 1 . We consider that x is discretized into a finite context space X with the cardinality |X | = X. The context evolution is independent of the players' choices of channel association, and follows an unknown stationary random process. When no collision over the channels (i.e., arms) occurs, the players (i.e., IoT links) receive rewards from their selected arms (channels) by measuring the normalized QoS feedbacks (e.g., capacity) over that channel. The players repeatedly play the game by simultaneously and independently pulling the arms (i.e., selecting the channels), with the aim of maximizing the social reward of all the players (i.e., the sum of best-effort transmit rates) accumulated over a finite but unknown time horizon T . Mathematically, we abstract the multi-player contextual bandit game for channel allocation in the ad-hoc IoT network as follows. 
denote the vector of instantaneous rewards received by the M players in round t. Then, by taking into account the collision of players over a pulled arm, we obtain the reward of player
where 1(a, b) is the indicator function with 1(a, b) = 1 if a = b and 1(a, b) = 0 otherwise. Let r t = [r t m,l ] 1≤m≤M,1≤l≤L denote the vector of the players' arm values with respect to context x, and D be the arbitrary distribution of the pair (x, r). Then, we aim to develop an algorithm that determines the joint policy
, i.e., the expected accumulated reward. To help examining the performance of our algorithm, we introduce the concept of regret as follows.
) denote the expected reward of a joint policy π. Let Z T = {(x 1 , r 1 ), . . . , (x T , r T )} denote a series of T context-value pairs drawn from the distribution D. Then, for an algorithm B that generates a corresponding series of policies B = {π 1 , . . . ,π T }, the expected regret of B with respect to a policy π is The regret of algorithm B with respect to policy space Π is
An efficient decentralized policy-learning algorithm B has to achieve a sublinear regret ∆R(B, Π, T ) in
Due to the partial observability that rewards are only revealed for the pulled arms, an efficiently algorithm needs to form the unbiased estimation of arm values in order to learn the accurate matching between the arms and the players. Furthermore, a purely decentralized algorithm needs to avoid requesting excessive exchange of action information among players. Thus, learning the optimal arm-allocation schemes solely based on their local information is preferred.
IV. EPOCH-BASED POLICY LEARNING ALGORITHM
Since the rounds of play T is not known in advance, we divide the process of decentralized learning B in repeated plays into epochs/mini-batches, each of which contains three explicit phases of policy exploration, optimal-policy learning and policy exploitation. Figure 1 shows the structure of one epoch of plays from the perspective of synchronized IoT devices. During the exploration phase, the players independently try different arms uniformly at random in order to estimate the mean value of the payoff obtained on each arm when no collision occurs. Consequently, with the observation accumulated in the exploration phase, the players adopt a purely decentralized learning scheme through trial-and-error from [29] to learn the optimal arm association. This is achieved through distributively searching the social-optimal equilibria of a group of intermediate non-cooperative games, which are constructed based on the arm-value estimation obtained in the exploration phase for different contexts. In the exploitation phase, the players stick to the policies derived from the policy-learning phase for multiple rounds. Intuitively, the estimation of the expected reward for each arm-player pair may introduce errors, and the arm allocation learned in the policy learning phase may be sub-optimal as well. As a result, the main goal of our study is to analyze the error propagation from the first two phases and determine the bound of the regret of the entire learning process subsequently.
The policy-learning algorithm in the mini-batch framework of Figure 1 is formally presented in Algorithm 1. In the k-th epoch, the number of rounds needed for a player in the phases of exploration, trial-anderror learning and exploitation are functions of the epoch number, i.e., f (k), g(k) and h(k), respectively.
In the exploration phase (Lines 3-9 in Algorithm 1), a single player learns independently its expected payoff over each arm by randomly selecting its actions. In the trial-and-error learning phase, a group of 
where µ k m,am (x) is the expected reward of arm l = a m that player m estimates in the k-th exploration phase, derived following (5) .
The design of the intermediate games in Definition 3 is based on the presumption that the most efficient equilibria of the constructed games for each x coincide with the social-optimal policies of the MP-MAB game. The detailed discussion on the validity of this presumption will be given in Section V. To develop a purely decentralized policy-learning scheme in Algorithm 2 for obtaining the social-optimal equilibrium of the intermediate game G(x), we introduce the auxiliary state of player m regarding context x at time slot Algorithm 1 Policy learning at player m in the contextual multi-player bandit game.
Initialization: Set W m = {} and u k m,l (x) = 0 ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , L} and ∀x ∈ X . Choose ∈ [0, 1] 1: for Epoch k = 1, . . . , k T do 2:
Exploration phase: 3: for t = 1, . . . , f (k) do 4: Sample an arm a t m ∈ {1, . . . , L} uniformly at random and observe the feedback
if v t m (a t ) = 0 then 6:
Estimate the expected value of arm l = a t m at x t : Trial-and-error learning phase:
if k = 1 then 13:
∀x ∈ X , set the auxiliary state at t = 0 in (8) 
∀a m ∈ A m , set the count of times for getting a content mood with a m as ν k m,x (a m ) = 0 18:
Update a t m and z t m (x t ) according to Algorithm 2 for x t based onμ k m,l (x t ), and ∀x = x t , set z t m (x ) ← z t−1 m (x ) 20: Update the frequency of visits to the content states aligned with benchmark values as
where u t m (x t ) is the observed payoff in the intermediate game G(x t ) by player m according to (4) 21: end for
22:
Exploitation phase: 23: for t = 1, . . . , h(k) do 24: For x t , play a * ,k m with the maximum number of state visits according to ν k m,x t (l), ∀l:
25:
end for 26 : end for t from [29] as follows:
where o t m (x) ∈ {C, H, W, D} indicates the moods of player m: content (C), hopeful (H), watchful (W ) and discontent (D). a t m (x) represents the benchmark action and u t m (x) represents the benchmark payoff adopted by player m in round t, respectively. For simplicity, we omit x in the expressions for the same game and define the following transition map of a finite behavior state machine for each type of players:
• A content player updates its action as a t m ∈ A m with a probability:
• A hopeful player or a watchful player always plays the previous benchmark action, i.e., a t m ← a t−1 m . • A discontent player selects a new action uniformly at random, namely, ∀a t m ∈ A m , p m (a t m ) = 1/L. With the auxiliary states defined in (8), we introduce enhanced trial-and-error learning from [29] in Algorithm 2. Note that in Algorithm 2, G(u) and F (u) are strictly monotonically decreasing linear functions for any u ∈ [0, 1], and the conditions 0 < G(u) < 1/2 and 0 < F (u) < 1/2M are to be satisfied (see Theorem 2 for the details).
V. ANALYSIS OF THE REGRET FOR ALGORITHM 1
We note that in Algorithm 1, the regret is mainly due to sub-optimal actions in the exploration phase and the trial-and-error learning phase. In the latter phase, each player is supposed to learn the optimal matching policies while avoiding collisions in |X | intermediate games following the rules defined in Algorithm 2.
In each game G(x) (x ∈ X ), the learning processes of all the players jointly define a large discrete-time Markov chain over the set of all possible auxiliary states (see also [29] ). Therefore, the regret analysis regarding Algorithm 1 is expected to mathematically determine the regret due to the arm-value estimation in the exploration phase and the regret due to the sub-optimal policies derived in Algorithm 2. For ease of exposition, we first provide the main result of the theoretical bound on the regret of Algorithm 1 in Theorem 1, before presenting the analytical procedures for the two phases in concern.
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem on the Algorithm Regret). Consider a multi-player bandit game with a finite set of contexts, i.e., |X | = X, as defined in Definition 1. With T rounds of plays and a sufficiently small policy-learning parameter ∈ [0, 1] in Algorithm 1, the regret of Algorithm 1 is upper-bounded by
if we set
Proof Sketch. Since r t m,l ∈ [0, 1], the network-wise regret of the exploration phase and the trial-and-error learning phase in the k-th epoch can be easily upper-bounded by M (c 1 + c 2 k δ ) in the worst case, in which Algorithm 2 A single round of state transition by player m in G(x) at the k-th epoch.
Initialization: ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, retrieve the fixed, perturbed arm-value in the current context x asμ k m,l (x) 1: Select a t m according to state z t−1 m (x) of the player, and observe u t 
21: end if every player at each round in these two phases produces the maximum regret of 1. Then, to bound the regret in exploitation, we only need to bound the error probability Pr k e of the arm-value estimation in the exploration phase and the probability Pr k l of learning sub-optimal allocation policies in the trial-and-error learning phase. Thus, we obtain the upper bound of the total regret of all the players in the following form:
The complete proof of Theorem 1 relies on the analysis of the error probability of the exploration phase in Section V-A and that of the trial-and-error learning phase in Section V-B. Based on such a two-step analysis, the detail of the proof to Theorem 1 will be given in Section V-C.
A. Error Probability of the Exploration Phase
The goal of the exploration is for every player to obtain the unbiased estimation of the mean values of all arms in each context x ∈ X . Then, the total sampling period in the exploration phase has to be sufficiently long since the expected sum of regret incurred by the uniformly random exploration of one round for all players can be as large as O(M ). Denote N m = |W m | (c.f., Line 6 of Algorithm 1) as the number of samples accumulated by player m until the end of the current exploration phase in Algorithm 1.
We note that for an individual policy π m (x) of player m, the unbiased estimator of the reward based on the collected data W m in Algorithm 1 iŝ
where 1/L is used to adjust the impact of the uniformly random action sampling.
Then, we have E{μ m (π m )} = E (x,rm)∼Dm {r m,πm }, and from (14),
The analysis of the upper bound of the arm-value estimation error relies on two inequalities [30] as follows.
Fact 1 (Bernstein Inequality). If for a sequence of random variables Y 1 , . . . , Y N , Pr(|Y i | ≤ c) = 1 and E(Y i ) = 0, then for any N > 0,
where c is a constant and
Fact 2 (Chernoff Inequality). If for a sequence of random variables Y 1 , . . . , Y N , |Y i | ≤ 1, then for any
Based on (15)-(17) we obtain Lemma 1 as follows. explorations, with T 0 given by:
where γ is the pre-determined exploration error probability for a maximum estimation error η.
Proof. For player m which has undergone at least C rounds of valid explorations (i.e., explorations with no collisions), the probability of not having sufficiently accurate arm-value estimations for a non-colliding policy π m (∀m ∈ M) adopted in the exploitation phase in Algorithm 1 is bounded by
where Π m is the set of deterministic policies for player m and |Π m | = L X , (a) is obtained by the union bound, (b) is obtained following the Partition Theorem and (c) is obtained following the Bernstein Inequality in Fact 1. To satisfy the condition of sufficient accuracy η with an error probability γ 1 , we have
Note that the above condition in (20) is obtained when the players sample the arms uniformly at random and no collision occurs. To obtain the condition for accumulating sufficiently large number of valid arm observations for each player, we denote A i m as the event that a player m observes any arm l ∈ A m without experiencing collision at the i-th sample. During the exploration phase, whether experiencing a collision is independent of the context that the game in. Then, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . we have Pr(
For the probability in (21) to be upper-bounded by γ 2 , we need
Then, with probability (1 − γ 2 ), we have ∀m ∈ M, N i=1 A i m ≥ N 2 E{A i m }. To ensure that every player has a sufficient number of valid observations, we also need
Since for any L > 1, 
Then, having γ 1 = γ 2 = γ/2, (24) guarantees that with more than N rounds of exploration, any policy is estimated with an error within η with probability 1 − γ. This leads to (18) .
From (18) in Lemma 1, we note that for an error probability of arm-value estimation with maximum bias η, Pr k e = γ, Algorithm 1 needs to undergo at least T 0 rounds of exploration as
If the exploration has at least c 1 = 16L(L+cη/3) η 2 turns at each epoch, then, at k-th epoch, for a maximum estimation error η the error probability can be bounded as follows
Note that with the normalized arm-values, we can simply choose c = 1 in (27).
B. Error Probability in the Trial-and-error Phase
In addition to Lemma 1 and (27), we need to further analyze the impact of the arm-value estimation errors on the learning results in the trial-and-error phase. Specifically, we expect that the optimal contextual bipartite matching policy derived based on the biased arm-value estimation is the same as the optimal policy derived based on the real expected arm-values. Lemma 2 confirms this assumption. is constructed upon the real expected arm-values E{r m,l |x}, andĜ(x), which is constructed upon the estimated arm-valuesμ m,l , respectively. For G(x) where V π (x) = M m=1 E{r m,πm |x}, we denote an optimal joint policy as π * and a best non-optimal joint policy asπ. Then, if
forĜ(x) whereV π (x) = M m=1μ m,πm (x), we haveV π * (x) >Vπ(x) as well.
Proof. Since L ≥ M , π * andπ must be collision-free. By inequality construction of the condition at the beginning of Lemma 2 and the definitions of V π (x) andV π (x), we have (note that we omit x for conciseness)
Then, for π * we have
For any non-optimal policy π, its value can be bounded by the best non-optimal policyπ as follows:
Subtracting (30) by (31), we obtain the following inequality with the condition η < V π * (x)−Vπ(x)
2M
:
(32) shows that for gameĜ(x), any optimal joint policy π * (x) in game G(x) also achieves strictly higher social reward than the non-optimal policies in G(x). Therefore, a social optimal policy in gameĜ(x) must also be optimal in G(x).
Lemmas 1 and 2 guarantee that as long as the estimation error η is small enough, the true social optimal policy can be derived based on the biased estimation of arm-values after sufficiently long exploration in Algorithm 1. Therefore, we only need to examine the policy efficiency of the trial-and-error learning phase based on the rules defined in Algorithm 2. Regarding the intermediate game G(x) in context x, we have Lemma 3. The social-optimal payoff by the players in game G(x) is achieved at a pure NE.
Proof. Lemma 3 relies on the assumption of L ≥ M . We note that at epoch k, game G(x) with fixed arm values for m ∈ M, µ k m,l (x), belongs to the category of one-sided matching games with user preferences [31] . Then, by randomly ordering the players in a list, and sequentially assigning each player in the list their best available arm, we are able to obtain a non-colliding allocation a k = [a k 1 , . . . , a k M ] . It is straightforward to check that ∀m ∈ M, a k m is a best response to the joint actions of the other players a k −m .Thus, a k constructs a pure NE, and we know that more than one pure NE exists in G(x). Furthermore, with L ≥ M , player m's better response to a k −m can only be pulling a free arm. Indeed, a player's better response always leads to a Pareto improvement, since no other players changes their payoffs. Then, we can check by contradiction that the social optimal policy a k, * in G(x), where V x (a k, * ) = max a M m=1 u x,k m (a), is also an NE. Firstly, with L ≥ M , the optimal action a k, * has no collision. Otherwise, a colliding player can always find a free arm as the better response, which constitutes a Pareto improvement.
Secondly, at a k, * no player is able to find a better response. Otherwise, at least one player m can find some free arm a m , that leads to a joint action a = (a m , a k,
, contradicting with the optimality assumption. Therefore, by the definition of an NE, we obtain Lemma 3.
With Lemma 3, we are left to show that the policies obtained from Algorithm 2 converge to not only an NE, but also the most efficient NE of the intermediate game. Note that following the rules of state transition defined in Algorithm 2, the state-updating dynamics of each player m jointly constitute a large discrete-time Markov chain over the set of the joint auxiliary states z(x) = [z 1 (x), . . . , z M (x)] as defined in (8) . Following the approach of the Markov chain-based analysis for log-linear learning in [29] , we are able to examine the efficiency of the trial-and-error learning phase in Algorithm 1 for a given intermediate game G(x). Before proceeding, we introduce the concepts of regular perturbation and stochastically stable states from [29] , [32] for Markov chains as follows. By [29] , we know that for a perturbed Markov process P with a set of stochastically stable states Z * , there exists α > 0 for any small α > 0 s.t. whenever 0 < ≤ α , z(t) ∈ Z * for at least 1 − α of all periods in the process. Therefore, it is natural to desire that the social optimal NE of a game G(x) (see Lemma 3) constitute the stochastically stable states of the Markov process defined by the rules given in Algorithm 2 when > 0. This is guaranteed by the following theorem. Proof. Lemma 3 guarantees that the social optimal policy of game G(x) is also a pure NE. Therefore, the learning scheme defined in Algorithm 2 satisfies condition (i) of [29, Theorem 1] . Let P (x) denote the family of (perturbed) Markov processes defined in Algorithm 2 in a single epoch for context x. Following the same approach of proving [29, Theorem 1], we only need to show that the social optimal NE are stochastically stable states of P (x), namely (a) these social welfare-maximizing NE are aligned with some states contained in the recurrent communication classes of the unperturbed process P 0 (x), and (b) in the sub-graph of states constructed over the directed transitions between the recurrence classes of P 0 (x), these NE minimize the stochastic potential (see [32] for the formal definition). Namely, there exists a state-tree spanned on each NE state that minimizes the sum resistance of the edges (see also Definition 4) in the tree among all the possible spanning trees in this recurrence graph.
Condition (a) relies on the identification of recurrence classes (cf. [29, Lemma 1]). Condition (b) requires
enumerating the minimum resistance of the edges ended on different states in the considered sub-graph (cf. [29, ).
The proof to Theorem 2 strictly follows the approach of proof to [29, Theorem 1] , except the slight difference in the interdependence property 2 between game G(x) and the non-cooperative game considered in [29] . In G(x), we note that a player i can only cause another non-colliding, non-experimenting player j's payoff to decrease or remain the same (both with non-zero probability) by altering its own action. Such a "partial interdependence" property indicates that only the sub-set of non-colliding players are interdependent on the action of the other players due to potential collision. This eliminates any path in a state graph of the Markov process P (x) s.t. a non-colliding, non-experimenting player j's state transits to mood o j = H (i.e., observing reward increase) due to another player i's action experimentation. Therefore, we only need to consider the O(1) probability that one player's experimenting action collides with another player in the original proof to [29, Lemma 1] and obtain the following result: Following the approach of the proof to [29, Theorem 1] , we denote E 0 (x) as the subset of C 0 (x) where the benchmark actions align with a pure NE. Then, to analyze the minimum resistance of an edge out-going from z E (x) ∈ E 0 (x) in the transition graph of the recurrence states, we only need to consider a single case regarding the path between z E (x) and z D (x) ∈ D 0 (x). Due to partial interdependence in G(x), one single player experimenting two consecutive times can only lead to a path of transitions C → W → D due to twice collisions with a probability of O( 2 ). Since any state z(x) with at least one player being discontent has 0 resistance to D 0 (x) [29, Claim 1] , this leads to a simplified version of the proof to [29, Lemma 2] and thus the following propostion: Proposition 2 (Lemma 2 in [29] ). In the state graph of perturbed transitions constructed on the recurrence classes of P 0 (x), ∀z e (x) ∈ E 0 (x), z e (x) → D(x) is an easy edge. Namely, z e (x) → D(x) has a minimized resistance of 2 among all possible out-going edges from z e (x).
The rest part of the proof follows exactly the same approach of the proof to [29, Theorem 1] , where the resistance of edges out-going from both non-equilibrium content states and discontent states are also identified, and then the easy trees (i.e., those with the minimum sum of resistance) are constructed on each recurrence state. Since we do not need to make any change to the intermediate proofs to [29, , for conciseness, we omit the details of the proof and suggest the readers to refer to [29, Section 6] .
Because [29, Theorem 1] holds, by Lemma 3 we know that the stochastically stable states of P coincide with the social optimal NE strategies of the considered game, which completes the proof to Theorem 2.
Together with Lemma 2, Theorem 2 indicates that for the intermediate game G(x) constructed directly upon the estimated arm-values µ k m,l , we can always find an α and a sufficiently large number of rounds s.t. each player visits the real social optimal actions of the underlying bandit game for at least 1 − α of the total trial-and-error rounds. However, if G(x) has multiple social optimal NE 3 , the non-cooperative players may reach a sub-optimal joint allocation with solely the action selection scheme in Line 24 of Algorithm 1.
We overcome this uncertainty by replacing the estimated arm-values in G(x) with the randomly perturbed valuesμ k m,l (x) = µ k m,l (x)+ξ m,l (x), where ξ m,l (x) is independently sampled following a uniform distribution over [−ξ, ξ] for context x.
Therefore, we obtain a condition that ∀l ∈ A m , |µ k m,l (x) −μ k m,l (x)| ≤ ξ. Applying the same approach of proving Lemma 2, we can always find a sufficiently small ξ, s.t. for the optimal policy π * and the best non-optimal policyπ, the following inequality is satisfied
Thereby, any optimal NE policy of game G(x) becomes the candidate optimal NE policies of the new gamẽ G(x) constructed upon the perturbed arm-valueμ k m,l (x). We consider two different and non-colliding actions a and a s.t. they achieve equal social rewards in G(x), i.e., m∈M µ k m,am = m∈M µ k m,a m . Omitting x again, we consider the probability that a and a also achieve the same social reward in gameG(x): Therefore, the perturbation ∀m, l : ξ m,l (x) guarantees that the social optimal SE ofG(x) is unique with probability 1. This leads to the operation in Line 11 of Algorithm 1 4 and Proposition 3. We consider g(k) = T 1 rounds of plays in the k-th trial-and-error learning phase, which contains X independent perturbed Markov processes. Now, we are ready to examine the inherent error probability of not reaching stochastically stable states in P (x). Suppose that each process P (x) continues for T 1 (x) rounds, 3 We can construct such a game by setting the expected rewards of M arms to be uniformly 0 < µ < 1 for each player and the other arms to be always 0, with the non-zero arm-values sampled from discrete distribution. then we have x∈X T 1 (x) = T 1 . We denote E * (x) the singleton of stochastically stable state that aligns with the unique social optimal NE in context x. Then, with Line 24 of Algorithm 1, the probability of players selecting optimal actions in the exploitation phase is determined by the frequency that ∀x ∈ X : E * (x) are visited. We denote A x as the event that for context x the optimal policy is adopted after the trial-and-error phase and A the event that for all contexts the optimal policies are adopted. Then, we have
To bound Pr A x , we apply the approach of analyzing the accumulated weights of random walks on general (irreversible) finite-state Markov chains from [33] . At epoch k, with the initialization step in Line 12
of Algorithm 1, the trial-and-error learning process for a game G(x) constitutes a random walk of T 1 (x) steps with an arbitrary initial distribution φ(x) over the states on the Markov process P (x). Let 1(z t (x), E * (x))
indicate that the stationary stable state E * (x) is visited at the t-th sample in the subsequence of plays corresponding to G(x). Let α x denote the expected frequency of not visiting the stable state. Then, the stationary distribution of P (x) is ψ x (E * (x)) = 1 − α x . We can treat 1(z t (x), E * (x)) as a weight function of the random walk, s.t. the expected total weight is
as T 1 (x) → ∞.
According to (7) , we know that an optimal NE is guaranteed to be played during the exploration phase when the majority of trial-and-error learning plays visit E * (x). Namely, Pr(A x ) is larger than the probability of the event T 1 (x) t=1 1(z t (x), E * (x)) ≥ T 1 (x)/2. Equivalently, we obtain
Then, following [33, Theorem 3.1], we have
where (a) follows (38) by setting
φx(z(x)) , and τ x ( 1 8 ) is the mixing time of the Markov process P (x) for an accuracy of 1/8 (see [33, Theorem 3.1] ). By selecting a sufficiently small for each P (x), we are able to adopt a unique target stable probability ∀x ∈ X : ψ x (E * (x)) ≥ ψ, where ψ is a constant. We note that the right-hand side of (39) is a monotonically decreasing function of ψ x (E * (x)). Then, we can set ψ x (E * (x)) = ψ. To ensure 0 < ρ < 1, from (1 − ρ)ψ ≥ 1 2 we obtain ρ ≤ 1 − 1 2ψ and ψ > 1 2 . Then, we can choose ρ = 1 − 1 2ψ and obtain
.
(40)
We know that
Then, for ψ > 1 2 , the right-hand side of (40) is a monotonically decreasing function of ψ. Thereby, we can pick ψ ≥ 2 3 (consequently, ρ ≤ 1 4 ), and obtain
Then, by (36) and (41) we know that the error probability after running g(k) = c 2 k δ rounds of trial-and-error learning is
where x = arg min x ω(x)/τ x ( 1 8 ), and by construction of Algorithm 1 we have T 1 = c 2 k δ . Again, since the right-hand side of (40) is a monotonically decreasing function, we can always find an epoch k ensuring that the upper bound of Pr k l shrinks to a sufficiently small value.
C. Regret Bound of Algorithm 1
Now, we have the probabilities of errors propagated from the exploration phase, i.e., Pr k e and the learning phase i.e., Pr k l bounded by (27) and (42), respectively. Thereby, we are ready to provide the formal proof to Theorem 1 in the following discussion. We assume that the mild conditions such as the condition of discernible arm-values in Lemma 2 are satisfied by the considered contextual bandit game. Recall that we set in Algorithm 1 f (k) = c 1 k, g(k) = c 2 k δ and h(k) = c 3 2 k in each epoch of the learning process. We suppose that the total number of epoch is K, s.t.
Then, by taking logarithm to both sides of the inequality in (43), we can derive the logarithmic upper bound of K as K ≤ log 2 (T /c 3 + 2). The total regret incurred by the learning scheme in Algorithm 1 is composed of three parts, namely, the regret due to action exploration, trial-and-error learning and due to sub-optimal (erroneous) policies in the exploitation phases. We note that for each round of play the total regret of the M players could be as large as M . Then, we obtain the regret bound of a single epoch in the form of (13) .
We note that with δ > 1 there exists an epoch k 0 , s.t. ∀k ≥ k 0 , exp − ω(x)
Then, from (44) we obtain that with β = 2 e < 1, for k > k 0
Since the second term of the right-hand side of (45) vanishes exponentially with k, we obtain that for some constant C representing the constant regret until the first k 0 epoch,
where (a) is obtained by replacing K with log 2 (T /c 3 + 2), and (b) is obtained by replacing C with
Then, (46) completes the proof to Theorem 1.
VI. ADAPTATION TO UNOBSERVABLE CONTEXTS
In this section, we consider the situation where the contexts exist but are not released/observable at the beginning of each time slot. Since the learning processes cannot be established for discernible context x Definition 6 (Modified Regret). Let the expected reward of a policy π without discerning x be denoted by
. For the series {r t } T t=1 , drawn from the distribution D m,rm , the expected regret of algorithm B = {π 1 , . . . ,π T } with respect to a policy π is
The regret of algorithm B with respect to policy space Π is
Algorithm 3 Modified exploration phase for player m with non-observable context at the k-th epoch. Sample an arm a t m ∈ {1, . . . , L} uniformly at random and observe the feedback (a t m , v t m (a t )) 3: if v t m (a t ) = 0 then 4:
Estimate the expected value of arm l = a t m : 
since the learning algorithm no longer discerns the underlying context x. Subsequently, for an exploration phase that lasts for c 1 k rounds in epoch k, we have a new probability bound for the exploration error:
Therefore, without any modification to the discussion of regret bound in Section V-C, we can show that Theorem 1 still holds with exactly the same form of bound: 
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Evaluation of the Proposed Algorithm
First of all, we demonstrate the efficiency of Algorithm 1. For comparison, we implement the "Musical Chairs" (MC) algorithm [34] as the first reference algorithm. It is worth noting that MC addresses the decentralized MP-MAB problem in a setting of homogeneous arms and no context. We adopt the Hungarian algorithm to indicate the ground-truth social optimal arm-allocation with a centralized allocator 5 . Throughout the experiments, we adopts the parameters for the trial-and-error learning algorithm as Table I and the parameter of total exploration rounds for MC as T 0 = 3000. For convenience of demonstration, we investigate the evolution of payoffs over time for the compared algorithms in a contextual MAB of 2 players, 3 arms and 3 contexts, where for each player, the contexts and arm values are jointly sampled from discrete uniform distributions. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the players' average rewards as the learning algorithms progress over time, where the curves marked as "Static Hungarian" indicate the expected rewards of individual players (Figure 2(a) ) and the expected average reward (Figure 2(b) ) at the social-optimal allocation in the game. The gaps between the rewards of the "Trial and Error" (TnE) and the "Musical
Chairs" curves indicate that our proposed algorithm is able to better adapt to the stochastic evolution of the contextual dimension. Meanwhile, the fluctuation in the "Trial and Error" curves reflects the epoch-based characteristics of our proposed algorithm that accommodates unknown total number of plays, whereas the MC algorithm has one single exploration-exploitation epoch of pre-determined rounds of explorations.
In Figure 3 , we compare the evolution of the average regrets of TnE, MC and another epoch-based decentralized learning algorithm, i.e., the Game of Thrones (GoT) algorithm [35] , as the total number of plays (horizons) T (c.f. (3)) increases. Note that GoT also adopts a decentralized, perturbation-based policylearning framework for social-optimal allocation, but is not able to discern the contexts in the game. In "O(M log δ 2 (T ))" represents the theoretical bound for the regret of TnE learning. We obtain a heuristic and tighter bound than that of (46). Expressed in the same form as (46), the heuristic regret bound has a set of parameters as c 1 M = 200, c 2 M = 40 and C 1 = 0 for the considered game. As shown in Figure 3 , GoT is able to achieve a lower regret than MC with its expressiveness of heterogeneous arms, while TnE is able to achieve a lower regret with a much faster convergence rate than GoT.
B. Algorithm Evaluation in Heterogeneous IoT over Shared Bandwidth
In this section, we apply our proposed learning algorithm for channel allocation in the simulation of an ad-hoc, heterogeneous IoT network over unlicensed spectrum. We perform a series of simulations with the focus put on the following parameters: (a) the sum of the normalized throughput (i.e., rewards), (b) the frequency of collision and channel switching during policy learning and (c) the scalability of the proposed algorithm. Again, throughout the simulations, we consider that the channel statistics are unknown and heterogeneous with respect to different IoT devices. We also consider that the spectrum in concern is licensed to a cellular network, and a number of non-moving licensed users may randomly occupy and leave the band with different levels of transmit powers. The contexts of the bandit game reflect the IDs and the 4×10 4 6×10 4 8×10 4 10 5 1.2×10 5 1.4×10 5 1.6×10 5 1.8×10 5 2×10 5
Total number of plays power levels of the licensed users. We consider that a fixed number of randomly distributed IoT devices move in slow motion and reuse the frequency of the licensed users for their own narrow-band transmission.
For the IoT network, the entire spectrum is divided into a fixed number of logical channels 6 . The IoT devices are assumed to move following a Gauss-Markov mobility model [36] . We also assume that for each IoT device, the multipath effect remains the same within a single time slot. Then, we obtain an MP-MAB formulation for multi-channel allocation with stochastic interference contexts as described in Section III.
In Figure 4 , we demonstrate the simulation results for a setting of 10 IoT devices over 12 logical channels of the bandwidth, which is randomly accessed by 3 licensed users. We compare our proposed TnE algorithm with the MC algorithm, the GoT algorithm and an MAB-based channel swapping algorithm, i.e., "Stable Orthogonal Channel (SOC)" allocation [13] . It is worth noting that SOC is able to model the heterogeneous distribution of arm-values in a non-contextual setting, but aims to achieve stable non-colliding allocation instead of social-optimal network performance. For comparison, we set the perturbation parameters for GoT and the proposed TnE algorithm to be the same as = 0.01 and the constant parameter as c 2 = 3000 to determine the length of the learning phase. Figure 4 (a) clearly shows that our proposed scheme achieves the best performance out of the 4 algorithms in terms of normalized sum rate along the time horizon. Figure 4 (b) indicates that the better performance of the proposed algorithm is achieved at the cost of slightly more collisions, due to frequent policy explorations over the time. Furthermore, as indicated in Figure 3 , GoT has a significantly lower convergence rate, even when the number of joint auxiliary states are smaller 6 For instance, in NB-IoT-like networks, this could be implemented by grouping the OFDM symbols into a fixed number of L available resource blocks. In each physical resource block a device experiences independent path loss and shadow fading, but face the stochastic interference of the same transmit-power level from the underlying transmission of the UEs in the macrocell. than the proposed TnE algorithm due to ignoring the contexts. We believe this is the main reason for GoT to experience higher collisions in Figure 4 (b). In other words, GoT needs a much longer policy-learning phase (equivalently, a larger c 2 ) than TnE to achieve a better performance than MC. Figure 4 (c) shows the frequency of channel switching against the same contexts. More specifically, the switching frequency measures the consistency of action-taking against different context by different algorithms. The lower the frequency, the higher the policy consistency is. Comparing the proposed TnE algorithm with the other reference algorithms, we can observe that with a slightly higher switching frequency, TnE is able to avoid blindly choosing the same policy for different contexts as MC and SOC. Meanwhile, it is able to discern different contexts and then maintain good stability in action-taking accordingly. Instead, GoT fails to do so and thus results in frequent policy switching during the game.
Finally, we examine the scalability of different algorithms with respect to the network size in Figure 5 , for which we fix the horizon of simulations to be 4 × 10 5 rounds for different network sizes varying from 5 nodes to 30 nodes. For for each epoch in TnE and GoT, the length of the perturbation-based learning phase is set to start with a parameter c 2 = 3 × 10 3 for a network of 5 nodes and then increase proportionally as the network size grows. As shown in Figures 5(b) and 5(c), the proposed TnE algorithm and GoT experience more collisions than MC and SOC, as network size increases. This is mainly due to both the significantly longer policy exploration and the larger auxiliary state space as the network size increases. Again, the GoT algorithm needs significantly larger number of rounds to achieve the same level of performance as MC and SOC when the network size increases. As a result, it may not scale well with the network size.
Comparatively, the proposed TnE algorithm is able to achieve the better performance (see Figure 5 (a)) than the other reference algorithms at an acceptable cost of more frequent collisions (see Figure 5 (b)) and higher policy inconsistency (see Figure 5 (c)) mainly due to longer exploration.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a decentralized channel-allocation algorithm based on trial-and-error learning for the IoT networks operating on the shared bandwidth. The proposed algorithm guarantees socialoptimal performance through repeatedly constructing intermediate non-cooperative games in the epochbased exploration-exploitation framework of multi-player, multi-armed bandits and then by learning the equilibrium policies according to the players' local reference states. The proposed algorithm is able to address the situation of time-varying channels with underlying unpredictable interference from the licensed transmissions. Theoretical analysis proves that the proposed policy-learning scheme is able to achieve the optimal regret in O(M log 1+δ 2 T ) (δ > 0) complexity for a multi-player bandit game of M players along a time horizon of T . Our proposed algorithm is especially appropriate for deployment in infrastructure-less networks with rigid constraint on communications between links. Particularly, the only information needed by the algorithm is about the activity states of the licensed users through beacon packet-reading and the inter-link collision states on a channel through the receiving device's feedback. The simulation results show that the proposed algorithm is able to achieve better performance than a number of reference schemes on realistic channels underlaying a licensed LTE or 5G network.
